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The Constitutional Problem of
Taxing Gifts as Income
Philip Mullock*
All students of the income tax must, I am sure, feel a debt
of gratitude to Professors Klein' and Del Cotto2 for their re-
searches into the antecedents of and justifications for the gift
exclusion;3 and one would, I suppose, have to be at least one
sort of fool to rush in over ground so well-trodden by the
angels.4 My excuse for any appearance of foolishness in resur-
recting Klein's enigma is two-fold. While Klein and Del Cotto
are in agreement that the gift exclusion should be neutralized
if not abolished, two different justifications therefor are put
forward, one by Klein, which Del Cotto endorses, and a second
by Del Cotto independently. Klein's case against the gift ex-
clusion rests essentially on a rejection of "ordinary language"
as the appropriate criterion for determining either the mean-
ing of the word "income" in section 61 (a) or the meaning of the
word "gift" in section 102 (a); and Del Cotto's thesis is that an
income tax on the recipient of a gift would be indirect, thereby
avoiding the problems of meaning raised by the sixteenth
amendment. Since I believe Klein's proposal reflects an impor-
tant misconception and Del Cotto's thesis is, subject to an
important proviso, correct, it may further the cause and avoid
confusion if I give my reasons for these beliefs.
Professor Klein's case against the gift exclusion of section
102(a) consists, partly in his own words, of the following points:
1. The bulk of the cases involves payments by employers ...
to employees or their widows, where the payment had not
been bargained for and the employer was in no sense legally
obligated to make the payment .... The courts could have
defined the term "gift" to exclude payments motivated by an
employment relationship. In fact, however, the courts have
treated the question of gifts vel non as one that turns prin-
cipally on the "intention" of the payor.5
* Professor, Walter F. George School of Law.
1. Klein, An Enigma in the Federal Income Tax: The Meaning
of the Word "Gift," 48 ITNx. L. REv. 215 (1963).
2. Del Cotto, The Trust Annuity as Income: The Constitutional
Problem of Taxing Gifts and Bequests as Income, 23 TAx. L. REv. 231
(1968).
3. INT. REv. CODE Of 1954, § 102 (a).
4. See also R. MAML, TAxELE INcowm (rev. ed. 1945) which
foreshadows much of what Klein and Del Cotto have to say.
5. Klein, supra note 1, at 217-18.
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2. As a matter of common parlance a distinction exists between
the terms "gift" and "income;" therefore, to treat gifts as in-
come requires a rather broad definition of the term "in-
come" for tax purposes .... 6
3. [Ordinary meaning] is determined by the dominant mental
image evoked in the mind of the average man when [the
word "gift"] is used. .... 7 [T]o determine the colloquial
meaning of the statutory language ... the question in each
case would then be whether the transfer in question corre-
sponded with the commonly held image of a gift.8
4. To insist that gifts cannot be taxed as income because they
are not described as income in common parlance is to insist
on precision of language at the expense of sound tax policy.
In this instance precision of language may properly be sacri-
ficed to permit a statement of the issue in terms of whether
income should be defined to include gifts and inheritances.0
Finally, Professor Klein concludesIc' that section 102(a) makes
little sense because: (a) it can be justified only in terms of
social purpose, but no apparent social purpose is evident in a
blanket exclusion of gifts from gross income; and (b) the
legislative history fails to reveal any legislative purpose for the
exclusion; it is neither the product of any reasoned legislative
choice nor does it reflect any legitinate objective of tax policy.
It should be noted that Professor Klein is not just echoing
Dean Griswold's plea for "new guidelines."" Indeed, his ap-
proach to ordinary meaning would mean that none could be
forthcoming. Rather, he advocates a judicial interpretation of
the Code whereby section 102(a) would be interpreted as
narrowly as possible so as not to apply to transfers made in a
business context, and section 61 (a) would be given as broad
an application as required to complement the narrowing of
section 102(a).
Although his theory of ordinary meaning given in point three
above may seem excessively psychological in the nineteenth
century tradition, and would no doubt raise shrieks from con-
temporary philosophers of the ordinary language bent, we can,
for present purposes, let it pass. What does matter is that
while Professor Klein has, so to speak, managed to get the lid
screwed on the jar, he has succeeded in getting it screwed on
incorrectly. In fact, gifts with business overtones should be
6. Id. at 224.
7. Id. at 219.
8. Id. at 261.
9. Id. at 224.
10. Id. at 260-63.
11. See Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor
Hart and Judge Arnold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAv. L.
REv. 81, 88-91 (1960).
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included in section 61(a) and excluded from section 102(a) not
by dint of judicial legerdemain but simply because Congress
and the Constitution require that ordinary meaning be the con-
trolling factor. In order to explain the significance of ordinary
meaning in the interpretation of sections 61(a) and 102 (a) it will
be necessary to enlarge upon the point Professor Lowndes has
stressed,12 and which Professor Del Cotto endorses. 13 That is,
in levying an income tax Congress is not limited to whatever
it is that constitutes income within the meaning of the word
"incomes" in the sixteenth amendment.
By virtue of Article I, Congress has plenary power to lay
taxes; virtually anything can be reached by Article I provided
that excise taxes are uniform and direct takes are apportioned.
Hence, a direct tax on a source of income would be unconsti-
tutional under Article I if unapportioned. The narrow func-
tion of the sixteenth amendment is therefore to allow Con-
gress to tax incomes regardless of source and without the ne-
cessity of apportionment if the tax is direct; it does not dilute
the plenary power under Article I. Professor Lowndes has
concluded from this that the federal income tax might be ap-
plied constitutionally to a gain which is not income within the
meaning of the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment;1 4
Congress derives its power from Article I, not from the sixteenth
amendment.
It is clear, I think, that Congress has the power under
Article I to tax anything, except perhaps interest on state and
municipal bonds,15 as long as any direct tax is apportioned; that
if the impact of a tax on "incomes," as that term is used in
the sixteenth amendment, is direct there is no need for appor-
tionment; and that section 61(a) is an exercise of the Article I
power. To the extent that the meaning of the word "income"
12. Lowndes, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income, 25 Owo
ST. L.J. 151 (1964).
13. Del Cotto, supra note 2.
14. Lowndes, supra note 12, at 161. To illustrate his point, Pro-
fessor Lowndes states that a statute regulating prices might provide
that over-ceiling prices for goods sold shall not be deductible for in-
come tax purposes, so that the gross proceeds of those sales, rather
than the gross profit, would be included in gross income. Id. at 161-62.
This is a somewhat questionable illustration, for it seems to be a case
of the income tax being used nonfiscally as a penalty and not as a tax at
all. A better example would be to suppose Congress had amended
§ 61(a) so that the gross proceeds of certain sales were to be included
in gross income. See note 33 infra, and accompanying text.
15. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, modified,
158 U.S. 601 (1895).
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in section 61 (a) coincides with that of "incomes" in the six-
teenth amendment 6 there is no apportionment problem; but
if the meaning of the word "income" in section 61 (a) is extended
beyond that of "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment, the prob-
lem of apportionment under Article I arises if the impact of the
tax as extended is direct. No apportionment problem can arise,
however, from an extension of the section 61 (a) coverage beyond
that of the sixteenth amendment if the tax as extended is indi-
rect. In other words, if the impact of the tax imposed by virtue
of section 61 (a) is direct then the section 61 (a) meaning is lim-
ited to the sixteenth amendment meaning unless the tax is ap-
portioned; but if the impact of section 61 (a) is indirect then the
sixteenth amendment is irrelevant because the section 61 (a)
meaning is not then limited to that of the sixteenth amendment
and there is no apportionment problem.
The information we have concerning the meaning of the
word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment points to its ordi-
nary language usage;17 indeed it is difficult to see how it could
point elsewhere when we recall that we are dealing with a self-
assessing system of income taxation. In Eisner v. Macomber,
the Supreme Court stated:
... we require only a clear definition of the term "income," as
used in common speech, in order to determine its meaning in the
[sixteenth] Amendment .... After examining dictionaries in
common use ... we find little to add to the succinct definition
adopted in two cases arising under the Corporation Tax Act of
1909 . .. "Income may be defined as the gain derived from
capital, from labor, or from both combined," provided it be
understood to include profit gained through a sale or conver-
sion of capital assets .... Is
Since Macomber, the Supreme Court has decided several cases,' 9
culminating with Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company,2
0
which are generally considered to have both repudiated the
16. There seems to be no more than a stylistic difference between
the use of the word "income" in § 61(a) and "incomes" in the six-
teenth amendment. See notes 18 and 22 infra, and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S.
509, 519 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920); Lynch
v. Hornby, 247 U.S. 339, 343-44 (1918); United States v. Oregon-Washing-
ton R.R. & Navigation Co., 251 F. 211, 212 (1918).
18. 252 U.S. 189, 206-07 (1920).
19. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Commissioner v.
Lobue, 351 U.S. 243 (1956); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952);
Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940); United States v. Kirby Lumber
Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
20. 348 U.S. 426 (1955); accord, General Am. Investors Co. v. Com-
missioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955).
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suggestion in Macomber that no other definition of income would
do2' and to have "broadened" the concept of taxable income.
This broadening process could be regarded either as a rejection
of the Macomber definition as the embodiment of the ordinary
meaning of the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment or
as an extension of section 61(a) beyond the sixteenth amend-
ment concept of "incomes;" it does not appear to be a rejection
of ordinary meaning itself as the appropriate criterion of mean-
ing for the sixteenth amendment. But while it is unclear from
the Court's opinions exactly what is meant, it is noteworthy
that Congress has stated in no uncertain terms that section 61(a)
does not go beyond the sixteenth amendment:
[Section 61(a)] corresponds to section 22(a) of the 1939
Code .... Section 61(a) is as broad in scope as section 22 (a).
Section 61(a) provides that gross income includes "all income
from whatever source derived." This definition is based upon the
sixteenth amendment and the word 'income' is used as in sec-
tion 22 (a) in its constitutional sense.2 2
It has been suggested 23 that this Congressional statement re-
flects the influence of the Court's frequent and unfortunate
repetition of the idea that Congress in enacting section 22(a) of
the 1939 Code intended to reach all income taxable under the
sixteenth amendment, 24 any implication that the power to tax
income both derives from and is limited by the sixteenth amend-
ment being presumably false.25 In any event, if the Congres-
sional statement is to be taken at face value, and the Court
seems disposed so to take it, 26 then the meaning of the word
"income" in section 61(a) is to be determined by the meaning
of the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment; and if the
latter in turn is to be understood in its ordinary sense then the
meaning of the word "income" in section 61 (a) must be limited,
by reason of the manifested legislative intent, to its ordinary
meaning.2 7
The judicial repudiation of the Macomber definition of the
21. 252 U.S. at 207.
22. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 168 (1955).
23. The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HARV. L. REv. 119, 196-97
n.470 (1955).
24. See General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434
(1955); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955);
Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
25. Language suggesting the implication can be found in Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 203 (1920): "[C]ongress intended in [the 1913
Act] to exert its power to the extent permitted by the [sixteenth]
Amendment."
26. See cases cited notes 19 and 24 supra.
27. See note 16 supra.
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word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment, coupled with the
emphasis placed on the congressional restriction of section 61 (a)
within the bounds of the sixteenth amendment, 28 suggests at
most that the Court now believes it was mistaken as to what
constitutes the ordinary language meaning of the word "in-
comes" in the sixteenth amendment; it does not mean that the
Court has now decided that ordinary language itself is not the
proper criterion for determining the meaning of the word "in-
comes" in the sixteenth amendment. Moreover, as long as Con-
gress insists that section 61(a) goes no further than the sixteenth
amendment meaning of the word "incomes," any judicial or
administrative attempt to extend section 61(a) beyond that limit
would be improper. The difficulty in determining just what the
Court has been doing here could lead one to suspect that it has
rather craftily put itself in the position of being able, if it so
wishes, to stretch the sixteenth amendment concept of "incomes"
beyond the bounds of ordinary meaning without having to
acknowledge that it is doing so. At the same time it could honor
the congressional statement of intent by limiting section 61 (a)
to the (expanded) meaning of the word "incomes" in the six-
teenth amendment. It cannot be said, however, that the Court
has yet gone that far; the broadening of the Macomber concept
of taxable income to cover cancellation of indebtedness, 29 illegal
gains3" and windfalls31 can still be accommodated within the
ordinary language concept of "incomes." And while this broader
ordinary language concept of income will, I believe, quite readily
embrace gifts "with business overtones, 32 it will not extend to
gifts simpliciter; the fact that the Supreme Court has tied the
sixteenth amendment to ordinary meaning and Congress, in
turn, has tied section 61(a) to the sixteenth amendment, effec-
tively bars enlarging the tax base to cover gifts generally.
This is not to say, however, that Congress could not ex-
pressly extend section 61 (a) beyond the meaning of the sixteenth
amendment word "incomes," as used in the ordinary language
sense. Suppose, for instance, Congress extended section 61(a)
by adding 61(a) (16) covering the costs of certain goods sold or,
alternatively, the gross proceeds of certain sales. This would be
28. See notes 19 and 24 supra.
29. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
30. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Rutkin v. United
States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
31. General Am. Investors Co. v. Commissioner, 348 U.S. 434 (1955);
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
32. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
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a valid exercise of the Article I power even though recoupment
of capital does not come within the ordinary language meaning
of the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment; 33 and un-
less the impact of the section 61(a) (16) tax on the costs of the
specified sales were direct there would be no problem of appor-
tionment under Article J.3 4 The recoupment of capital doctrine
therefore applies to section 61(a) on constitutional grounds only
so far as its coverage coincides with what constitutes "incomes"
in the ordinary language sense of that term as used in the
sixteenth amendment. Congress need concern itself with the
meaning of the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment
only when it wishes to amend section 61(a) in a way that will
have a direct impact.
I have suggested elsewhere35 that, for theoretical purposes
at least, it is sometimes helpful to think of the notion of income
in set-theoretical terms which disclose three distinct but related
ideas:
(1) gains taxable under Article I (hereafter "G");
(2) realized gains within the doctrine of Eisner v. Macomber3 6
and Helvering v. Bruun" hereafter "R"); and
(3) realized gains taxable as income under section 61 (a) (here-
after "T').
R is a subset of G and I is a subset of R. In the Case of G, the
33. Doyle v. Mitchell Bros., 247 U.S. 179 (1917) would seem to be
authority for this proposition even though it dealt with the 1909 Corpora-
tion Tax Act. See Merchants' Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, 255 U.S.
509, 519 (1921); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1921).
34. It foes not follow, simply because a tax on the gross receipts
of a certain industry was held in Spreckels Sugar Refining Co. v.
McClain, 192 U.S. 397 (1904) to be an excise not requiring apportion-
ment, that extending § 61(a) by § 61(a) (16) to cover the costs of certain
sales would automatically convert 61(a) into an excise tax so that ap-
portionment and the sixteenth amendment would no longer be rele-
vant; although, of course, if § 61 (a) (16) were to be regarded by virtue of
Spreckels as an excise tax then the sixteenth amendment would be
irrelevant so far as § 61(a) (16) was concerned.
35. Mullock, Current Conceptions of Taxable Income-A Comment,
26 Oio ST. L.J. 43 (1965).
36. 252 U.S. 189 (1919).
37. 309 U.S. 461 (1940). The doctrine of realization refers to what
Professor Lowndes has called the economic objectivity of taxable income,
Lowndes, supra note 12, at 171-82, and which denotes an event or trans-
action measurably changing the taxpayer's economic position in a way
that can be routinely handled by officials: it rests, as the Supreme
Court has pointed out, on administrative convenience, Helvering v.
Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 116 (1940); Mullock, supra note 35, at 46. I am no
longer sure that Professor Lowndes is correct when he concludes from
this that it is not a constitutional doctrine.
19681
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only limits on membership would seem to be those dictated by
political expediency; and to determine whether a member of G
should be admitted into R we have recourse to the doctrine of
realization. So far as I is concerned, admission into R carries
with it simultaneous admission into I unless there are good
reasons, having nothing to do with the problem of realization,
for excluding the realized gain from I. As with most, if not all,
legal concepts the notion of income has its defeasible aspects:
all realized gains are income unless .... 38 We have income
only if we have realized gain; if we do not have realized gain
we cannot have an item of income. Thus, gain and realization
are necessary for an item of income per section 61(a). However,
because of the "unless" factors there are realized gains which
are not taxable as income; thus gain and realization by them-
selves are not sufficient to define the word "income" in section
61(a). Failure to recognize this inevitably leads one to ask,
"Is this . .. income?" in cases which more properly pose the
"unless" question, "Why exclude this realized gain from gross
income?" The latter question calls for reasons and justifications
having nothing to do with the problem of realization.
If we take Congress at its word-that it is using the term
"income" in section 61(a) in the sixteenth amendment ordinary
language sense-then, as long as this remains the case, one "un-
less" ground for excluding from I a gain fitting in G which is
realized, and therefore a member of R, would be that it did not
come within the ordinary language sense of the word "incomes"
in the sixteenth amendment. Certainly, a "gift," in the ordinary
language sense, does not fit "income," in the ordinary language
sense, any more than does recoupment of capital; thus even
without section 102(a), gifts in the ordinary sense could not
constitutionally be brought within section 61 (a). It follows that
section 102(a) is no more than declaratory of the law absent
section 102(a). But even though Congress has limited section
61(a) to the sixteenth amendment ordinary language sense of
income, it does not follow that the Constitution requires Con-
gress so to limit section 61 (a); as we have already noted, it could
extend section 61(a) expressly beyond the sixteenth amendment
ordinary language concept of income by the exercise of its
Article I power.
Professor Klein, it will be recalled, would have the courts
38. See Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in PHnLOSOPHICAL PAPERS 123
(Urmson & Warnock eds. 1961); Hart, The Ascription of Responsibil-
ity and Rights, in LANGUAGE AND'LoGic 145 (1st Ser. Flew ed. 1951).
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interpret section 102 (a) as narrowly and section 61(a) as broadly
as need be, so that gifts with business overtones would be
excluded from section 102 (a) and included in section 61(a). Such
a proposal, we can now see, is misconceived simply because
gifts made in a business context are properly excludible from
section 102(a) and includible in section 61(a) by virtue of the
ordinary meanings of the words "gift" and "income" respec-
tively. The reliance on ordinary meaning is required not, as
Klein seems to think, by a mere desire for "precision of lan-
guage," but because Congress has tied section 61(a) to the six-
teenth amendment and the Supreme Court has tied the sixteenth
amendment and section 102 (a) to ordinary meaning. So far as
gifts simpliciter are concerned, if they are to be subjected to an
income tax, it will be necessary for Congress both to repeal sec-
tion 102 (a) -for as matters stand it is merely declaratory-and
expressly extend section 61(a) beyond the sixteenth amendment.
The problem would then be whether the extension of section
61(a) to cover gifts as ordinarily understood would result in a
tax which was direct rather than indirect. For if it would be
unconstitutional to include a gift in the gross income of the
recipient because the resulting unapportioned tax would be
direct, and if apportionment is generally unfeasible, there would
be little point in extending section 61(a) to cover gifts at all.
Two courses, therefore, are open to those who would, in effect,
abolish the gift exclusion of section 102 (a): they must show
either that the word "incomes" in the sixteenth amendment is
used in some sense other than that of ordinary language, or
that an income tax on the recipient of a gift would be indirect
for purposes of Article I. Since the first alternative is unlikely
to be realized, we may now turn our attention to the second.
Suppose that Congress has, as it well may, cut section 61(a)
free from the ordinary language ties of the sixteenth amend-
ment; that it has repudiated the statement set out above, and
has extended section 61(a) to cover gifts simpliciter and repealed
section 102(a). It would then be necessary to determine whether
the extended area of section 61(a) would result in a tax which
was direct rather than indirect. Professor Del Cotto argues that
an income tax on the recipient of a gift would be indirect for
purposes of Article I, and thus in no need of apportionment
"even though the receipt were not income."39 The latter ital-
icized point overlooks, of course, the fact that in addition to re-
39. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 254. This view was also subscribed
to by Professor Lowndes, supra note 12, at 160 n.42.
19681
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
pealing section 102 (a), for example, Congress would have to sever
the ordinary language ties of section 61(a). But since we are
making the assumption for him, we can confine ourselves to his
contention that the indirectness of an income tax on gifts may be
established on the basis of "closely related authority in the
areas of estate, gift and inheritance taxation which is persuasive
on this issue.140 The argument, taken from the court's opinion
in Simmons v. United States,4 1 is as follows:
1. The estate,42 gift43 and inheritance 44 tax law distinguishes
between
(a) a tax on property imposed solely by reason of its owner-
ship, which is direct, and
(b) a tax upon the exercise of some, but not all, of the rights
adhering to ownership, such as use or transfer of property,
which is indirect and therefore not subject to the require-
ment of apportionment.
2. A tax upon the donor of an inter vivos gift is indirect, being
merely a tax upon the exercise by the donor of the right to
transfer the property.4 5
3. If a tax on giving property is indirect, so is a tax on receiving
it, regardless of source.46
4. An income tax on the recipient of a gift is a tax upon the
receipt of property rather than upon the ownership of prop-
erty, and therefore is indirect.
The logic behind step (1) may no doubt escape those not
attuned to the niceties of judicial "reasoning," and one might
be forgiven for the naive thought that a tax upon some specific
part of the "bundle of rights" of ownership would be just as
direct as a tax upon the more slippery notion of ownership
in toto. Certainly, it would make little sense to argue that a
blow which breaks every bone in a body is direct but one that
breaks only a finger is indirect. But the Supreme Court has
spoken and it must now be conceded as settled that a transfer
tax, at least, is indirect. Moreover, in settling the nature of
these transfer taxes, the Court was engaged in interpreting
Article I as well as the respective estate, gift and inheritance
40. Del Cotto, supra note 2, at 254.
41. 308 F.2d 160, 166-67 (4th Cir. 1982).
42. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
43. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
44. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
45. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
46. Fernandez v..Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352-55, 361-62 (1945).
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tax statutes: It was laying down criteria for distinguishing
between a direct and an indirect tax. In other words, though
it arose out of cases involving the estate, gift and inheritance
taxes, the rule embodying the criteria must be regarded as a
constitutional rule to be applied whenever the direct-indirect
classification of a tax, by whatever name, is in issue for purposes
of Article I.
So far as step (3) is concerned it may be doubted, again on
logical grounds, that it follows from steps (1) and (2). 'While
we may agree that giving is one of the attributes of ownership,
it is not so clear that the same can be said of receiving. One
second before a gift is made the donor, as owner, has the right
to make the gift; but at that point in time the prospective
donee is not the owner of the subject matter of the gift and so
does not have a right to receive it based on ownership. Once
more, however, we must defer to the "higher learning"--no dis-
tinction may be drawn between giving and receiving. Hence
with step (3) well settled, nothing stands in the way of step (4):
an income tax on the recipient of a gift would be indirect and
thus free from the requirement of apportionment.
Three conclusions may now be drawn:
1. If Congress extends section 61 (a) to cover gifts [and repeals
section 102(a)] but reiterates the statement quoted earlier
limiting section 61(a) to the sixteenth amendment concept of
"incomes," then the extension will have to be brought within
that constitutional concept. That will be difficult, if not im-
possible, if the Supreme Court continues to rule that the word
"incomes" in the sixteenth amendment is to be given its or-
dinary language meaning. The weakness of Professor Klein's
case against the gift exclusion lies in his failure to appreciate
the significance of ordinary meaning.47
2. If Congress extends section 61 (a) to cover gifts [and repeals
section 102 (a) ] and expressly or by implication repudiates the
statement quoted earlier limiting section 61 (a) to the six-
teenth amendment concept of "incomes," then the sixteenth
amendment will no longer be relevant and the resulting tax
47. The Fourth Circuit in Simmons supports Klein, but again only
at the cost of ignoring the constitutional significance of ordinary mean-
ing. 308 F.2d 160, 167-68. The fact that Glenshaw Glass makes it
clear that consideration need not have been given for an item in or-
der for it to be classed as taxable income, does not entail that a gift is
income to the recipient; yet Professor Lowndes asserts that "the Glen-
shaw case makes it clear that there is no constitutional prohibition
against taxing gifts as income." Lowndes, supra note 12, at 170.
1968]
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will be constitutional under Article I without apportionment
because its impact will be indirect. The weakness in Profes-
sor Del Cotto's proposal is his failure to see the need for the
foregoing "if" clause.
3. As matters now stand, with section 61 (a) tied to the six-
teenth amendment ordinary language concept of "incomes,"
gifts made in a business context can, and gifts simpliciter can-
not be fitted into section 61 (a).
